







How the Decision-Making Literature 
Might Inform Career Center Practice 
Thomas S. Krieshok 
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literature suggests need reconsideration. This article summarizes those findings in light of their 
implications for career center practice, including less emphasis on becoming decided, more 
emphasis on acting as one’s own agent, and the importance of addressing clients’ resistance to 




How the Decision-Making Literature Might Inform Career Center Practice 
 Today’s career centers face increasing pressures from students and administrators to 
deliver the goods of career development. Success over the past 20 years has suggested what 
those goods might look like for large numbers of students. In their efforts to improve what they 
can offer in an increasingly competitive higher education marketplace, some campuses reduce 
the evaluation of career center effectiveness to the popular and easily measured variable of 
choice of college major. Some colleges even boast that they will only admit students who have 
committed to a major on their college application. Unfortunately, committing to a college major, 
especially when not yet ready to do so, may have more negative consequences than simply 
admitting that one is still undecided.  
 In a review of the empirical literature on career decision-making (Krieshok, 1998), I 
concluded there were ten things the field knows for sure, as well as ten things we assume we 
know but which the literature suggests need reconsideration. This article summarizes those 
findings in light of their implications for career center practice. Several of those conclusions are 
consistent with how we usually think about decision-making. Decidedness and related constructs 
of career decision-making skills, career decision-making self-efficacy, and vocational identity 
are being adequately assessed in research and practice. That individuals we see in practice vary 
in their decidedness, and that decidedness develops over time seem evident, as do the 
conclusions that career interventions increase decidedness, and that gender, SES, educational 
attainment, and ethnicity affect decidedness (though we don’t yet understand the mechanism by 
which this happens). 
 But other conclusions are much less obvious and considerably more unsettling. 
Beginning with a review of the cognitive and experimental social psychology literatures, what 
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emerges is a view of the decision-making process far removed from the completely rational and 
conscious process we typically embrace in practice. Instead, we find what might be called an 
“anti-introspectivist” (AI) view that holds that “… most processing performed by the human 
mind for decision making and behavior initiation is not performed at a conscious level, and that 
reflection on those decision-making processes is not only futile, but possibly confusing and 
detrimental to good decisions” (Krieshok, 1998, p. 217). 
 A few examples of the arguments supporting this view follow. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) held that because we are capable of processing only limited amounts of information, we 
tend to a) overvalue information readily available to immediate memory, b) represent unfamiliar 
data with similar familiar data, and c) fail to adjust to disconfirmatory information. In the area of 
career decision-making, we over rely on the same heuristic devices that make manageable all the 
information coming into our cognitive system and trying to impact our decisions. 
 Neisser (1967) outlined two different phases in the decision-making process, the first 
phase accessing memory passively or unconsciously to make a rough draft interpretation of the 
current experience, and a second more conscious phase that involves deliberate cross checking of 
the first solution. Most of the decisions we make in a day never get to the second phase, because 
they are adequately handled at the first phase. Epstein (1994) suggests this is nature’s way of 
protecting conscious awareness for more urgent and newer unlearned activities. When you start 
learning to drive, you are amazed by how much concentration it takes to keep the vehicle 
between the lines. But after that task is mastered, its control is relegated to unconscious 
processes, allowing still newer tasks (like using the clutch) to have fuller attention. Relative to 
career choice, whether I express an interest in this occupation or that one is probably determined 
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by an unconscious intuitive judgment, even if later I am able to articulate what (I believed) I was 
weighing as more important in the decision. 
 Blustein and Strohmer (1987) found with career decisions that we engage in confirmatory 
and disconfirmatory biasing, attending to information that supports alternatives we are already 
considering, and filtering out information that argues against those alternatives. And Bodden 
(1970), in discussing cognitive constructs, warned that decision makers might have a tendency to 
distort information in order to arrive at cognitive simplicity, a state more likely to yield a 
decision.  
 Unfortunately, we are mostly unaware that we use these devices, and are fairly well 
convinced we approach decisions on a conscious, if not always logical, basis. When asked to 
provide the reasons behind our choices about such things as who we date or which occupations 
are attractive to us, we readily provide such lists, even though the literature finds we very often 
leave critical items off the list and insert items of no consequence in our decisions (e.g., Slovic, 
Fleissner, & Bauman, 1972).  
 The generation of such lists drives most computerized career interventions, as well as a 
significant part of own career counseling when, for example, we have clients list their work 
values, generate a list of occupations satisfied by the list, and explore those. Several writers, 
including Bargh (1990) and Nisbett and Wilson (1977) argue that when deciders do attempt to 
articulate their constructs, when they try to retrace the steps used in making a particular decision, 
they often make errors. They titled their article, "Telling more than we can know," and 
examining studies on learning without awareness, subliminal perception, order effects, and the 
effects of others' presence on helping behavior, built a case for consistent errors in reporting our 
decisional values.  
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There is even evidence that introspection can lead us away from the very outcomes that 
persuaded us to introspect in the first place. Bargh and Barndollar (1996) described a "wise 
unconscious" whose wisdom comes in that decisions made and implemented at the unconscious 
level are often more satisfying than decisions made consciously. Apparently, we have a very 
difficult time answering “why” questions, so in order to short-circuit that difficult (anxiety 
arousing) work, we jump to shortcuts that allow us to get on to other activities. We bring to mind 
accessible, plausible, and easy to verbalize reasons, but those reasons often imply a new attitude 
or belief for us, especially if we are unknowledgeable about the subject matter. 
While the strictest AI view holds that we never have access to the reasons behind our 
choices, a less radical view asserts that such material is just much more difficult to access than 
we previously imagined. Engaging in such activities as guided imagery, journal writing, retelling 
stories of achievements from our past, and teasing out themes from vocational card sorts are all 
useful exercises that would make it more likely to uncover accurate values driving our decisions. 
Krumboltz’ (1993) monograph on private rules in decision-making seems especially pertinent to 
this discussion. 
A Metaphor 
 When I was a youngster my parents always owned a big station wagon. The rear seat of 
the station wagon, what we called the “way-back” inevitably faced rearward, allowing the 
occupants a most unusual experience of any trip. Unlike riders in the front or middle seats, the 
kid in the back seat always sees the world after things have happened, never before and never 
during. If you were to ask the kid in the backseat where she went on vacation, she could tell you 
various sites she remembers (the Statue of Liberty, the Grand Canyon) and you could piece 
together a reasonably good approximation of the itinerary. But you’d always have to keep in 
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mind that the kid in the back seat was pretty much guessing about the actual intentionality of the 
driver. You could presume that there was an adult in the driver’s seat, someone who was 
responsible and was generally making good decisions about routes. You might even imagine 
another grownup in the passenger’s seat, reading maps and making suggestions. But if you 
limited your interview to the kid in the back seat, you would be presuming a great deal, and 
probably missing a lot. 
 I think the literature on decision-making says consciousness is the kid in the back seat. 
Our unconscious is driving, and for the most part is making good decisions, but so far we have 
not found ways to communicate directly with the driver.  Now, unlike all but the youngest of 
way-back riders, our consciousness still thinks it is controlling the car, actually making the 
choices about where to go and how to behave. I believe the literature suggests otherwise. While 
we experience the world as conscious choosers, we either are not that way at all, or at least enjoy 
much less conscious authority over decisions than we believe. 
Krieshok (1998) reviewed the empirical literature and concluded with ten things the field knows 
for sure about career decision-making, as well as ten things we assume we know but which the 
literature suggests need reconsideration. This article summarizes those findings in light of their 
implications for career center practice, including less emphasis on becoming decided, more 
emphasis on acting as one’s own agent, and the importance of addressing clients’ resistance to 
engaging in anything more than simple short-term interventions. 
Challenged Assumptions 
 Decidedness is always good. The AI perspective challenges many of the assumptions on 
which we base our work in career centers. The first to be challenged is the assumption that 
decidedness is always a good or necessary thing. If in fact decidedness happens mostly at an 
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unconscious level, our attempts to manipulate it may in fact be doing more harm than good.  
While this is a fairly radical stance, several writers in the career development literature have 
supported this conclusion over the years. Frederickson, Rowley, and McKay (1975) urged 
counselors to help clients learn flexibility and elasticity in coping with change. Cabral and 
Salomone (1990) and Miller (1983) discussed the importance of chance events and happenstance 
in shaping career decisions.  
 Krumboltz’ (1994) work on self-efficacy theory argues that our interventions should be 
aimed not at forcing a decision, but at enabling clients to create a satisfying life in a changing 
work environment. Given the rapidity of change in the current economy, it makes less sense to 
perfectly spell out an individual’s skills, interests, and personality, and more sense to teach them 
to be flexible in adapting to change. That flexibility might include identifying areas of non-
interest and trying to develop some interest there, or identifying some areas of low skill and 
going out and developing new skills in that area.  
Mitchell, Levin, and Krumboltz (1999) have developed these ideas into a theory of 
“planned happenstance” that encourages us to always be watchful and ready for those 
opportunities that appear to randomly confront us, but that have critical importance in shaping 
our careers. In fact, they argue, while there is clearly a chance element in such happenings, we 
play a much more active role in both creating and in recognizing those events than we have 
previously assumed. This is quite different from how we do career counseling today. Instead of 
focusing our efforts on perfectly matching students to occupations, Mitchell, et al might argue 
we would do better to teach them the rudiments of matching, but then tell them that matching 
only plays one small part in their eventual success, that adaptability and resourcefulness-on-the-
fly will play even greater roles, and then work with them to develop those.  
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 Interventions are never harmful. A second assumption challenged by the AI perspective 
is that career interventions are never harmful. Since we are susceptible to mental processing 
errors, simply shoving large amounts of information at a decision maker might force errors in 
processing, and if commitment to an outcome is seen as required (even before the information 
has had a chance to percolate) unwise decisions could result. In an effort to help clients organize 
their decision making, counselors may be helping them become clear about a set of values that 
really aren't theirs, but that are reasonable explanations of the data most available (not 
necessarily most important) to them. 
 Most of us make reasonably good decisions on our own, without the help of counselors or 
other aids. It is for those times when decisions do not come easily that this is most important, 
because it is when we stop and think about our decisions that we can get into trouble, and that 
describes much of what happens in counseling. If a student comes to us for help in choosing a 
major, their lack of choice may simply be an instance of too little information about the world of 
work. But it may be due to delayed development, or to any number of other causes that will not 
be addressed by our simplest interventions. Committing to a major may still be necessary, but 
let’s not confuse commitment to a major with true decidedness. 
 Occupational information is always helpful. When it comes to occupational information, 
the AI perspective challenges us as well.  If we don’t know which information about an 
occupation is in fact most critical to us, then what might be required is exposure to the richest set 
of information about occupations available. If, for example, formality of a work site is very 
important to me, it is unlikely I will know that about myself. It is equally unlikely that any of our 
current assessments will inform me of that. However, if I visit a half dozen different work sites 
that vary in their degree of formality, while I won’t necessarily know that it is site formality that 
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attracts me to them, I will know that several of the sites are attractive to me and others are not. 
This argues for such activities as internships, informational interviews, field trips, and the like. It 
might also argue for the limited utility of text-only career information that can satisfy only a very 
limited range of variables and only in a limited fashion. 
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Implications for Career Centers 
Less Emphasis on Decidedness 
 The first implication of AI for career centers is that we reduce our view of decision-
making as the most critical outcome. I am much more comfortable teaching clients the skills and 
attitudes that will make it more likely they will be able to adapt to a changing world of work, and 
letting decidedness happen on its own. We need to recognize, and to insist on this with our 
clients, that career decidedness is not at all the same thing as career commitment. Many times 
conditions force us to commit to a choice when we are not fully decided, and often we are never 
fully blessed by a sense of decidedness. While I must commit to a college major in order to 
continue enrolling at my university, I must not assume that means I have decided on a line of 
work. What happens so often is that students come into our centers when their anxiety about 
choosing a major gets high enough to trigger some action. They come in ready to do exploration, 
but typically very anxious. Most often we tell them we can settle their anxiety by helping them 
find a suitable major. Once they have committed to such a suitable major, they proceed to the 
worst possible course of action; they push it to the far recesses of the mind so they don’t have to 
be anxious about it anymore.  
 Instead, a more desirable response would be, “Okay, I have committed to biology as a 
major, because it seems like a reasonable match with where I am today, and where I could see 
myself in five years. But, in fact, I am likely to change a great deal in the next five years, and 
more importantly, I am likely to be exposed to a thousand different people and situations that 
could provide opportunities for planned happenstance. Instead of forcing this issue to the far 
recesses of my mind, I must now, with the greatest of effort, redouble my resolve to attend to 
those thousand possibilities, to engage in self-exploration and awareness activities, to get as 
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many work related experiences as I can imagine (using a very broad definition of ‘work’), and on 
a regular basis revisit my commitment to biology as my major.”  
Becoming One’s Own Agent 
 Years ago, as I was starting out in the publish-or-perish world of academia, which itself 
was beginning to transform into a procure-grants-or-perish world, I became aware of the need for 
an agent. What I desperately needed was someone who knew me and knew my skills, truly 
understood what my genius was and where my weaknesses were. In addition, my agent would be 
knowledgeable about my particular specialty of vocational psychology, about the various 
journals I could write for and various grant possibilities I could apply for, and the politics 
involved in university life. Finally, my agent would have my best interests at heart, and would 
work diligently out of a sense of dedication to furthering my contributions to the field. While I 
think this describes a great job for someone, such agents do not typically exist in higher 
education or psychology, so I was left to my own. But clearly, some of my successes and failures 
through the years are related to how well I have been able to take on that role for my own career. 
Unfortunately, many of the skills required by that job description are not at all similar to the 
skills that would make me a good scientist or a good practitioner. Many of these skills require an 
enterprising set of interests and skills often missing in science, arts, trades, and the various 
helping professions.  
 I envision a career center offering something of a “boot camp” to all entering freshmen. 
This very intense intervention would be structured to thoroughly immerse students in the planned 
happenstance view of the world. Its first goal would be to convince students that simply choosing 
a major is a totally inadequate way of approaching this as an issue, but instead convincing them 
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to take a very active stance toward scrapping for new information, truly equipping themselves to 
move about in the jungle out there. 
Dealing With Resistance 
 The practice of career counseling for real clients presenting real problems makes for an 
even more difficult picture. Clients show up at our door knowing something about what they 
want. It might take the form of discomfort with their current job, or anxiety about not having a 
college major, but their expectation about how to resolve the problem is that the solution will be 
relatively quick and relatively effortless on their part.  
 Perhaps we have contributed to this expectation through our promotion of relatively 
quick assessments (almost never more than an hour for an entire battery), self-scored 
instruments, and our newer self-help web offerings. While I support all of these as tools in a 
comprehensive process of career counseling, and support their use as stand alone interventions 
for persons who need very little assistance, they nonetheless convey that career interventions are 
quick and simple. Add to this the use of these tools by many counselors not sufficiently trained 
to provide anything beyond such simple interventions, and the public has expectations based on a 
reasonable sample of reality.  
 When, as is often the case, the process requires much more effort, clients need to be 
converted to a mindset that allows greater probing and much more work on their part. This new 
mindset will also allow for less certainty in outcomes, less decidedness, and less surety, even in 
the midst of a commitment to a particular course of action. Converting clients who come in 
thinking they were going to take a test that would tell them what they should be requires 
sophisticated skills beyond what the typical beginning counselor has to offer. The age-old 
question about the difference between career counseling and personal counseling is never more 
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evident than it is here. The work that needs to be done is much the same, but the contract the 
incoming client has for career counseling is much narrower and needs to be renegotiated. 
 The decision-making literature demonstrates how complex career choice must be, and 
how easily the human mind is set adrift in a sea of career information. By attending to those 
findings, we will be more likely to provide real assistance and avoid overly simplistic 
interventions that may be doing much less good than we think.  Gregory, Lichtenstein, and 
Slovic (1993) recognized the delicate role played by someone helping another delineate their 
values, a role similar to the one played by career counselors. They described such facilitators 
"not as archaeologists, carefully uncovering what is there, but as architects, working to build a 
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